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Economic Consequences of 
Continued  U.S.  External Deficits 
The U.S. external deficit is commonly viewed as one of 
this country's  most serious economic problems  — and 
indeed a problem for the rest of the world as well. This 
judgment is based upon the widespread presumption 
that ongoing  external deficits are harmful and  ulti- 
mately unsustainable, a view that seems amply sup- 
ported by the inflation and other  economic disruptions 
that have often  afflicted deficit nations in  the past. 
Many observers have warned that intensified pressures 
on the dollar, reductions in future living standards, and 
other serious consequences are almost unavoidable 
unless fundamental policy actions are taken to bring 
the imbalance down; they warn further that these prob- 
lems will become increasingly severe the longer the 
current account deficit persists. 
Not all observers, however, agree that the U.S. deficit 
is necessarily harmful. Although a few even contend 
that  the deficit is beneficial, the main thrust of  the skep- 
tics' argument is that the problems of financing  and 
adjusting to the external  imbalance have been mis- 
stated and exaggerated.1  Some proponents of  this view 
maintain that the deficit is sustainable, at least in prin- 
ciple, and that market forces will make any adjustments 
needed to restore equilibrium to the external accounts. 
Others  contend that the preeminent  position  of the 
United States and the dollar in the international econ- 
omy enable this country to run persistent deficits while 
avoiding the problems afflicting deficit  nations in the 
'Herbert  Stein, for example,  has expressed doubts about the alleged 
problem of the external  deficit and the need for government action to 
remedy it. See 'A Primer on the Other Deficit," AEI Economist,  March 
1987, and the related argument in "The World Economy  Doesn't 
Hang in the Balance," Wall Street Journal, December 30, 1987. 
4  FRBNY Quarterly Review/Winter-Spring  1989 
past. Pointing to the continued robust performance of 
the U.S. economy,  these analysts in effect ask: Is the 
current  account deficit  really a serious problem, and 
are major policy steps to reduce the deficit necessary 
or desirable? 
This article evaluates the economic consequences 
likely to follow from continued large  U.S. external, or 
current account, deficits. The basic conclusion is that 
such deficits do represent a serious economic problem. 
Continued large U.S. deficits are likely to lead to longer 
term problems in large part  associated with the financ- 
ing of  the deficits, and to impose adjustment costs aris- 
ing from the macroeconomic  changes  in spending, 
exchange rates, and other variables needed to restore 
equilibrium. Moreover, the costs will probably increase, 
as will the potential risks to the  economy's financial 
and macroeconomic stability,  the longer the deficits 
persist. The skeptics admittedly have  raised  some 
legitimate questions about the exact nature of these 
problems and about the adjustments needed to restore 
equilibrium to the external sector.  Their arguments do 
not, however, make a plausible case  for benign neglect 
of the current account deficit. 
The first section of the article, a review of the issues 
under debate, explains that there is general agreement 
on the basic nature of the deficit: the external deficit is 
a reflection  of macroeconomic imbalances between 
domestic spending and national income and between 
national saving and investment. Controversy about the 
deficits has largely centered on their sustainability and 
the long-term implications of U.S. external indebted- 
ness, the need for policy actions to achieve external 
adjustment to equilibrium, and the extent to which the required changes are likely to become more severe the 
longer the adjustment is postponed. 
The  second section argues that the external deficit is 
theoretically sustainable, but primarily in a technical 
sense. In practice, the  accumulation of U.S.  external 
debt from continued large deficits may well lead to sig- 
nificant increases in  domestic real interest rates and 
other financial  strains.  These problems are likely to 
intensify with further growth in the debt relative to for- 
eign wealth. Moreover, the imbalances now making up 
most of the external deficit — between  merchandise 
imports and exports and between aggregate spending 
and national output —  cannot be sustained. Eventually, 
the supply of foreign savings that now finances these 
gaps will abate as our foreign borrowing increasingly 
goes to debt service. The United States will then be 
faced with the choice of restraining private consump- 
tion and government spending or suffering a decline in 
capital formation and consequent erosion of future pro- 
ductivity and living standards. 
The question, therefore,  is not whether  substantial 
adjustments must be made to restore external equilib- 
rium, but how and when they will be made and at what 
cost. The macroeconomic  changes  needed for the 
adjustment, described in the last section, will inevitably 
entail a significant slowdown in  real spending  from 
recent trends and potentially increase the problems 
and risks faced by policy makers in maintaining full 
employment and price stability. Like the financial con- 
sequences of U.S. foreign debt, these adjustment costs 
are likely to become increasingly  serious the longer 
large external deficits persist. Moreover, the adjustment 
to long-term  equilibrium is likely to occur only very 
slowly, and  indeed  may  not continue,  unless  policy 
actions beyond those already enacted are taken.  For 
these reasons, at least, benign neglect toward the U.S. 
external balance is apt to prove an increasingly prob- 
lematic and risky course. 
Terms of the debate 
The debate over the U.S. current account deficit is not 
about  fundamental  economic  concepts.  Virtually all 
analysts, regardless of their views, agree on the basic 
nature of the external imbalance  and  the general 
forces underlying it. The disagreements center on the 
specifics of the U.S. deficit, namely its precise causes 
and its particular economic consequences. 
By definition, the current account (external) balance 
is the difference between a nation's sales (exports) of 
goods and services  to foreigners  and its purchases 
(imports)  from foreigners  of similar goods and  ser- 
vices. The services include factor payments  — interest, 
dividends, and remittances—for the services of capital 
and labor. For the present discussion, the trade bal- 
ance can be viewed as the current account balance 
excluding  net payments on the nation's foreign 
indebtedness.2 
The current account is essentially a macroeconomic 
balance between national savings and investment or, 
equivalently, between national income and spending. 
That is, to the extent that a nation exports more goods 
and services than it imports, it must lend the difference 
by acquiring an equal amount of (net) claims on for- 
eigners. Net lending to foreign nations represents the 
difference  between  national  income, Y, and national 
spending, A, which is also the same  as the gap 
between  national  saving and investment, I. National 
saving refers to the total of private and public saving, 
that is, the difference between private saving, 5, and 
the public sector budget deficit, D. 
From  this perspective, the present U.S. current 
account deficit, CA, reflects the excess of private and 
public spending relative to this nation's income and an 
equal shortage of private domestic savings relative to 
the domestic demands for that saving  from private 
investment and the general government deficit;  these 
gaps are being financed by net borrowing from abroad, 
which can be viewed as a net import  of foreign saving: 
1) CA = A — Y 
= I + 0— S. 
The  trade deficit as defined above can be described in 
similar macroeconomic  terms as the gap  between 
national spending and output.3 
Table 1  illustrates how last year's current  account 
deficit of about 2.7 percent of GNP is accounted for on 
this basis.  In 1981, the last year the United  States 
recorded a surplus,  national  saving  and  investment 
were higher in relation to GNP (and the government 
deficit lower) than now, but the gap between them was 
virtually  negligible. The present deficit reflects a sub- 
stantial decline in the national savings rate (from both 
public and private sources) that has more than offset a 
modest drop in the (gross) investment rate. 
This macroeconomic  view does not, of course, mean 
that trade barriers, productivity, quality, and  other 
determinants of national competitiveness have no role 
in  overall U.S. trade performance. In many cases, 
2By this definition, the trade balance includes certain nonfactor 
service items, such as travel and transportation, which can be 
ignored in most of the discussion.  The balance of trade in goods 
only will be referred to  as the merchandise  balance. 
3This  follows from the  fact that, ignoring transfer payments  and labor 
remittances,  GNP is equal to national output (gross domestic product 
or  GOP) less net investment  payments to  other countries. Thus the 
trade deficit is only approximately equal to  the gap between  GOP 
and aggregate spending, although the discrepancy is lairly small. 
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ment and hence influence the external balance; more- 
over, such factors will, at the least, help determine the 
configuration  of exchange rates and other proximate 
economic conditions consistent with any given balance. 
More generally, neither the above identities nor the 
figures in Table  1  themselves reveal the ultimate 
causes of  the U.S. external deficit, and indeed the rela- 
lions are compatible with a wide range of alternative 
explanations. Moreover,  the deficit is clearly the (endo- 
genous) result of the basic exogenous factors deter- 
mining national  saving,  nvestment, income, and 
spending. In this sense, any problems or other conse- 
quences associated with the deficit are fundamentally 
attributable to the macroeconomic forces underlying it. 
Disputed issues 
Ultimately at issue in the debate over  the external defi- 
cit are the net overall benefits of measures to reduce 
the imbalance  compared  with those of alternative 
courses — including  benign  neglect.  This most  basic 
question  cannot be resolved,  however, without first 
determining the precise consequences of the deficit 
and evaluating whether and  to what extent they are 
likely to be problematic. 
Despite fierce debate over the issue, the question of 
what to do about  the deficit  does not depend exclu- 
sively or even mainly on its origins. Some proponents 
of supply-side economic policies have maintained that 
the external deficit is largely attributable to an improve- 
ment in the U.S. investment climate relative to that of 
other nations. This improvement stemmed in part from 
Sources of the U.S. External DefIcit 
(Percent of GNP) 
1973-79 
(average)  1981  1986  1988 
17.1  17.1  12.6  13.2 
5.6  5.2  3.1  3.0 
12.4  12.8  13.0  12.0 
—0.9  —1.0  —3,5  —1.8 
Gross domestic 
investment  16.8  16.9  15.8  15.8 
Memo: 
Current account 
balance/GNPf  0.1  0.2  —3.3  —2.7 
Notes: The difference between national saving and investment 
does not exactly equal the current account balance because 
of a small statistical discrepancy. 
t(—)indicates a deficit. 
business tax deductions enacted in 1982 and allegedly 
had the effect of attracting foreign capital to this coun- 
try. The balance of evidence, however, favors the more 
conventional view that the external deficit is mainly the 
result of a decline in national savings due to the fed- 
eral budget deficit and the drop in household saving, 
reinforced by weakness in demand abroad.4  Nonethe- 
less, the first view, even if correct, does not necessarily 
imply that policy makers can safely ignore the external 
imbalance; measures to reduce the deficit still may be 
needed if problems arising from its financing and other 
consequences are sufficiently great.  More generally, 
policies toward the deficit need to be based on current 
and likely future economic circumstances and not sim- 
ply on past developments: reversing all the individual 
historical  forces that caused the deficit may not be 
desirable or even feasible.5 
Much of the controversy  about the implications  of 
continued U.S. deficits concerns their financing. By offi- 
cial estimates, the book value of U.S. net indebtedness 
to foreign private  and  public  entities,  in the form of 
bank loans and deposits, bonds and other securities, 
and direct investment claims, is  now nearly $500 billion 
and rising rapidly.6 Servicing this debt entails a con- 
tinuing stream of  interest and dividend payments to for- 
eign countries;  these payments (a debit item in the 
current account)  will almost  surely increase  as the 
indebtedness accumulates. 
To many observers, continued financing of large U.S. 
external deficits is inherently  unsustainable.  Those 
viewing the deficit as a major problem worry especially 
about  limitations on foreigners' ability and willingness 
Table  1 





41n particular, both national and household  savings rates have been 
significantly lower over the last several years than in the 1970s and 
1960s. In contrast, gross investment  as a share of GNP has been 
about equal to its pre-1982  average, while net investment  has been 
noticeably lower. 
5Many  economists believe that it would be highly desirable to  raise 
private saving. There is little evidence, however, that policy can 
affect the private savings rate appreciably. If so, a  significant 
increase in national saving is likely  to be achievable  only if  the 
public sector's deficit is reduced. 
°The true market value of  the U.S. international  investment  position 
may differ considerably from its bdok value as reported by the U.S. 
Department  of Commerce. Several  studies indicate that the market 
value of U.S. net  direct investment  claims are substantially 
understated by the book value figures. For example, see Lois Stekier, 
'dequacy of International  Transactions  and Position  Data for Policy 
Coordination," Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve  System, 
International Finance Discussion  Papers,  no. 337, November  1988. 
There is also considerable evidence, however, that a significant 
portion of the  errors and omissions in the U.S. balance of  payments 
data over the last six years reflect borrowing from foreigners  that is 
not recorded in reported capital inflows or the net investment 
position. In any case, it is the increase of at  least $600 billion in U.S. 
net  obligations to  other countries over the last six years that is of 
primary significance here. 
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a crisis should those limits be approached. For exam- 
ple,  Steven Marris in a 1985 monograph predicted a 
"dollar crash" leading to U.S.  inflation and recession 
on this basis.7 Apart from the sustainability of the 
external debt growth,  there is considerable concern 
about its ongoing consequences,  in particular the bur- 
den imposed on future generations' living standards by 
the servicing of the indebtedness as well as the poten- 
tial financial strains arising from large and growing for- 
eign holdings of U.S. assets. 
In contrast, those taking a more benign view of the 
deficit argue that it is sustainable, at least in principle, 
and that market forces will be sufficient to ensure that 
necessary  financing  will be  available without undue 
strain.8 The implication is that explicit policy actions 
are not necessary to restore equilibrium to the current 
account. Others argue that foreigners have no choice 
but to lend their excess savings to the United States, or 
that this country, by virtue of its size and the dollar's 
role in the world economy, is uniquely able to borrow 
from abroad indefinitely. We will see in the next sec- 
tion, however,  that while the problems of financing the 
U.S. deficit may be different from those encountered by 
other countries in the past,  they are not necessarily 
any less problematic. 
The financial  consequences of the deficit can be 
thought of as ongoing in the sense that they are the 
legacy of the stock of  debt accumulated  by past deficits 
and hence need not disappear (at least at first) if the 
current account is brought back to balance. A second 
set of concerns is focused on the adjustments  in 
macroeconomic variables associated with the creation 
of the deficit and its subsequent evolution. That is, a 
current  account  deficit is the result  in a proximate 
sense of changes in domestic demand, prices, interest 
rates, exchange rates, and other economic conditions 
that constitute  the linkages  between  the  underlying 
macroeconomic imbalances and the external accounts. 
For example, most observers would  agree that the 
rapid growth of U.S. domestic demand relative to for- 
eign demand after 1982 and the sharp rise in the real 
value of the dollar  were major proximate contributors to 
the development of the trade and current account defi- 
'See Steven Marris,  Deficits and the  Dollar: the World  Economy  at 
Risk, Institute for International  Economics. Monograph  no. 15, 
December 1985. 
'Stein ("The World Economy")  admits the possibility of a "dollar 
crash" scenario involving sharp domestic interest rate increases  but 
argues that its deflationary effects can be offset by monetary  policy. 
This seems  somewhat  optimistic in view of the lags in private 
economic behavior and policy makers' perceptions and actions. 
cit.9 Likewise, the creation of the deficit also involved 
an effective contraction of activity in traded-goods 
(mainly  manufacturing) sectors relative to nontraded- 
goods industries such as housing and services. Any 
future reduction of the  U.S.  external deficit is apt to 
entail at least a partial reversal of many of these 
changes, the consequences of which are  apt to be 
partly beneficial  and  partly problematic. Among the 
chief  concerns about these adjustments are the implied 
reduction in the growth of  domestic spending and living 
standards, and th& potential deterioration in trade-offs 
between price stability and real growth that may arise 
from the required macroeconomic changes. 
A key contention of those viewing the deficit as a 
pressing problem is that the ongoing and adjustment 
costs are closely related and likely to become increas- 
ingly severe the longer the imbalances  continue. These 
points are especially evident from several recent 
analyses  that assume  (on the presumption  that an 
ongoing  deficit is unsustainable) that the current 
account must ultimately return to balance.1° Because 
of the debt accumulation, achieving such balance  is 
likely to become progressively more difficult the longer 
the  deficit  persists: the larger the external debt, the 
greater the trade surplus needed to meet the debt ser- 
vice payments. A hysteresis thus may arise from con- 
tinued deficits, in the sense that the adjustments in the 
dollar and other macroecomic  variables needed to 
restore equilibrium to the current account become 
more severe the longer they are postponed. In the fol- 
lowing two sections, which discuss these ongoing and 
adjustment implications of  the deficit in more detail, we 
will see that a hysteresis may well  occur even if a cur- 
rent account deficit can be sustained. 
Ongoing  financing problems of the deficit 
At present borrowing rates, the U.S. could add  more 
than $500 billion to its foreign indebtedness over the 
next five years. An external debt of this magnitude 
would be historically unprecedented, both in size and 
in relation to foreign wealth; servicing the debt could 
eventually absorb 1  percent or more of this country's 
GNP. Thus it is not surprising that the financing of the 
U.S. current  account deficit has led to much concern 
Analysts  differ more on the relative importance of  the various 
proximate factors, such as  the contribution of interest rates to the 
dollar's rise. 
10A good example is Jeffrey Sachs' analysis of the sacrifice ratio of 
output gains to inflation in the creation of  the deficit and its 
subsequent reversal.  See Jeff  rey Sachs, "The Dollar and the Policy 
Mix," Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1985. Similar 
reasoning  underlies John Williamson's  calculations of equilibrium 
dollar exchange  rates (The Exchange  Rate System,  Institute for 
International  Economics, Monograph  no. 5, September 1983). 
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Three basic and closely related issues are raised by 
this financing.  The first concerns whether  continued 
U.S. deficits are sustainable. The answer to this ques- 
tion largely determines whether the current account 
must necessarily return to balance or not. A second 
issue, less often mentioned but in a sense more funda- 
mental, is the ongoing financial consequences for U.S. 
interest rates and financial  market conditions of 
increasing levels of U.S. indebtedness. The third issue 
concerns  the long-term implications  of the debt for 
future U.S. wealth and living standards. 
The sustainability question 
The view that the U.S. external imbalance is inher- 
ently unsustainable is very widespread, although not, 
as we have seen, undisputed. Claims are often heard 
that foreigners will eventually run  out of funds to 
finance the current account deficit or will become satu- 
rated with U.S. debt. These assertions  are oversim- 
plified: the current  account deficit is sustainable in a 
technical  sense. Of more practical significance, how- 
ever, is that the present trade deficit and the imbalance 
between spending and national output underlying it are 
not sustainable even in theory. 
Technically,  there is no reason why the United States 
or any other nation could not run a current account 
deficit  indefinitely. Assertions that foreigners will run 
out of funds to purchase U.S. assets ignore the fact 
that  the world  economy is growing  so  that  the 
resources available for lending are continuously 
increasing. In such an environment, a current account 
deficit  is theoretically  sustainable as long as the 
resulting debt to foreigners eventually stabilizes rela- 
tive to income and wealth. The technical requirements 
for this stability are explained  in  the accompanying 
Box.  A current  account deficit that remains constant 
relative to GNP will eventually lead to a stable debt- 
GNP ratio, a point illustrated in Table 2.11 
In another  important  respect,  though, the present 
U.S. current account position is unsustainable. 
Because servicing payments will rise as the external 
debt accumulates, maintaining the current account defi- 
cit at a constant ratio of GNP will require a decline in 
the trade portion of the deficit, that is, the deficit 
excluding net interest payments. The Box shows in fact 
that if the  interest rate paid on foreign indebtedness 
just equals the nominal growth rate of  the economy,  the 
trade account will  ultimately have to be balanced for 
l1f course, a current account deficit cannot absorb more than all 
available  foreign funds (Or, more practically, the bulk), nor can the 
external debt exceed total foreign wealth. Even the most pessimistic 
projections of the U.S. external deficit and debt are well below such 
technical limits, however. 
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the current account to be sustainable. In this case, the 
current account eventually just equals the debt service 
payments, with the debtor nation in  effect borrowing 
the net interest due. If the  interest rate exceeds the 
growth rate, then the trade account must be in surplus 
to help pay the servicing costs.'2 
These technical observations have some important 
practical implications. First, as just noted, the U.S. cur- 
rent  account need not necessarily return to balance to 
restore equilibrium to the U.S.  external  sector.'3 
Indeed, the longer the present current account imbal- 
ance persists, the higher the debt and debt service 
payments will become, and the greater the likelihood 
that the U.S. will become a persistent deficit nation. 
Even more important, however,  is that  most of the 
adjustments deemed necessary to balance the current 
account  will have to be made  even if the current 
account remains in deficit. The 1988 U.S. trade deficit 
was about $135 billion, virtually the same as the overall 
current account deficit. Bringing this large trade deficit 
back to balance will require substantial adjustments in 
trade flows, in U.S. and foreign incomes, and in other 
macroeconomic  variables. Moreover, the present situa- 
tion, in which borrowing from abroad is effectively 
financing an aggregate spending level nearly 3 percent 
greater than output, must also cease eventually. As this 
borrowing is increasingly devoted  to servicing the 
external debt rather than financing domestic spending, 
this country will be faced with a choice between 
restraining  private consumption and government 
spending or allowing a decline in the rate of domestic 
capital  formation.  Clearly, therefore,  the meaningful 
question is not whether substantial adjustments in the 
external accounts  should be undertaken,  but when, 
how rapidly, and under what  circumstances they are to 
occur. 
12The measured  return on the book value of U.S. investments  abroad 
has typically been significantly greater than that on foreign 
investments  here.  Last year, the gap in the  two returns was so great 
that U.S. net service payments  were virtually zero despite an officially 
estimated debt  of well over $400 billion. It is  possible, although by 
no means certain, that this country's rate of return on its assets will 
continue to exceed that paid on foreign liabilities (although not nearly 
to the degree recorded in 1988). If so, the  effective interest rate on 
U.S. net external debt  could remain below the economy's  growth rate, 
making an ongoing trade deficit a technical possibility: this deficit is 
likely to be fairly  small in relation to GNP, however  (see Box). 
13WiIl  the present imbalances  between national saving and investment 
and between spending and income  stabilize or rise relative to  GNP? 
We can be reasonably  assured, based on past experience,  that the 
gap between private saving and investment,  which is generally small, 
will remain stable. Whether the public sector budget deficit will fall 
(as it has in the last two years) or resume  increasing relative to  GNP 
will depend upon policy choices. Stability in the deficit-GNP ratio is 
not automatic and indeed involves  essentially the same technical 
conditions as apply 10 the external imbalance  (that is, balance or 
near-balance  in the budget excluding interest payments  on national 
debt). Box: Technical Aspects of Current Account Sustainability 
This box explains in more detail the technical aspects 
of current account  sustainability  and related  implica- 
tions summarized in the text. For the most part, the 
conclusions are directly analogous to more often dis- 
cussed  observations concerning the sustainability  of 
public sector  budget deficits. 
A current account deficit can be sustainable only if it 
leads eventually to a stable ratio of external debt, D, to 
domestic GNP,  Y, and foreign wealth, which for sim- 
plicity will be assumed to grow at the same rate. (The 
basic conclusions  are easily generalized  when the 
growth rates  differ.) This means that eventually: 
1) D'/D = Y'/Y = g, 
where D'ID, the proportional growth rate of  the nominal 
external debt (D' is its absolute change), must equal the 
nominal GNP growth rate, Y'fY or g, expressed in deci- 
mals. Suppose now that the current account deficit to 
GNP ratio is stable at some ratio (CA/Y)*. (Note that a 
deficit corresponds to a positive value of CA.) This cor- 
responds to a stable long-term equilibrium  debt/GNP 
ratio of (D/Y)* that  follows directly from relation 1 (multi- 
ply each side by Y/D and note that, ignoring valuation 
changes, CA = D'): 
2) (D/Y)*  = (CA/Y)* + g. 
Thus the long-term debt ratio is greater the larger the 
sustained  CA in relation to GNP and the lower  the 
country's nominal growth rate. 
To determine the relation between the long-term cur- 
rent account and the debt servicing, suppose that the 
nominal interest rate paid on the net indebtedness  is "r" 
so that debt service  payments are r(D/Y)*. The trade 
deficit, T, is sini'ply the difference between the overall 
current account and this debt service: 
(T/Y)* = (CA/Y)* — r(D/Y)*. 
We can  express this in terms of the current account/ 
income ratio as: 
3) (TIY)* = (1  —. r/g)(CA/Y)*. 
It follows that if the  interest rate just equals the .GNP 
growth rate, the trade balance must ultimately be in bal- 
ance, leaving the entire current account deficit to ser- 
vice the external debt. If the interest rate paid exceeds 
(is less than) the growth rate, the long-term equilibrium 
trade balance must be in surplus (deficit). 
As noted in the text, the point is of  potentially signifi- 
cant practical importance because of its implications for 
the ultimate servicing of the external debt and for the 
adjustments needed to ensure the sustainability of the 
current account itself. Recall that the current account is 
the difference between GNP and national expenditure, 
A; GNP, or national income, is itself equal to the value 
of national output or gross domestic product, "0," less 
net factor payments to foreign  countries. With some 
inessential oversimplification  (ignoring labor remit- 
tances and other factor payments  unrelated  to the 
external debt), this means that  the trade deficit  is  simply 
the difference between national output and expenditure, 
so that eventually: 
4) (T/Y)* = (A/Y)* — (Q/)* 
To understand the significance of these relations, sup- 
pose that a nation having no  external debt begins incur- 
ring a trade and current account deficit. Initially,  of 
course, this means that national spending exceeds both 
national income and output. But as the trade  deficit sub- 
sequently declines, the initial gap between output and 
spending must close, even it that between income and 
spending (that  is, a  current account deficit) remains. For 
example, if the interest rate equals the economy's 
growth rate, national expenditure must eventually come 
back to equal output. That is, in the long run, national 
output  goes entirely to national  spending,  as it did 
before the current account imbalance developed. Note, 
however, that national income will have  fallen  relative to 
output by  the amount of the long-run debt servicing. 
Hypothetical Equilibrium Trade Balance 
Configurations 
(Assuming Nominal GNP Growth  of 7.5 Percent  per 
Year) 
FRBNY Quarterly Review/Winter-Spring  1989  9 
Trade Surplus/GNP  Nominal Interest Rate 
(Percent)  6.0  7.5  9.0  11.0 
With CA/GNP  ratio 
of 1 percent  —0.2  0  0.2  0.5 
of  2.5 percent  —0.5  0  0.5  1.2 
of  4.0 percent  —0.8  0  0.8  1.9 
Notes: Figures calculated from relation 3 in the  text  of 
the  Box. CA. refers to the  current account deficit. 
(•—) indicates a deficit in the trade balance. Box: Technical Aspects of Current Account Sustainablilty (continued) 
In contrast, if the  interest rate exceeds the growth  rate, the nation may be able to maintain a permanent 
rate, national expenditure  must eventually fall below  deficit in trade and expenditure above the level of out- 
real output, part of which is devoted to servicing the  put.) Hypothetical illustrations of the potential size of 
external debt. Both the ultimate reduction in national  the trade surplus imposed by the debt-service burden 
• 
spending and the macroeconomic  adjustments needed  are given in the table. Clearly this burden will be less 
to bring it about will be greater in this case than when  than would be the case if the current account itself had 
the interest rate is equal to or below the growth rate.  to return to balance, but it could nonetheless be 
(Of course, if the interest rate is less than the growth  significant. 
—  —  —  -.  --——-—-—-—  —  —-——--——-—  —-  —-———-—-——--  —-————-—————— 1 
Table 2 
Consistent Long-Run  Rates of Debt and 




1  2.5 
With nominal GNP growth 
of 7.5 percent  13  33  53 
With nominal GNP growth 
0110.0  percent  10  25  40 
Note: Figures calculated according to formula:  debt/GNP = 
(deflclt/GNP) ÷ g, where g is the nominal GNP growth rate 
expressed in decimals. The figures refer to long-run ratios. 
Financial terms of the indebtedness 
To say that continual  U.S.  borrowing from abroad  is 
possible in principle conveys little about its actual fea- 
sibility or its effects. Theoretically, U.S. borrowing is 
limited by the amount of available foreign savings; in 
practice, institutional and  other constraints on the 
capacity of foreign lenders to accumulate U.S. assets 
almost certainly impose more stringent limitations on 
U.S. indebtedness.  But whether continued U.S. borrow- 
ing  proceeds smoothly, leads to severe financial 
strains, or ends in a crisis is likely to depend less on 
absolute institutional limits than on the willingness of 
foreigners to accumulate the debt and the effects of 
such willingness  on financial markets.  In particular, 
continued rapid increases in U.S. indebtedness may 
well put significant upward pressures on U.S. real and 
nominal interest rates and could add to the volatility  of 
domestic and international financial markets. 
It is reasonable to expect that the accumulation of 
U.S. foreign indebtedness will lead to somewhat higher 
U.S.  real interest rates than would otherwise prevail. 
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Generally, the real return on any given type of asset 
must be greater the larger its supply in relation to the 
market as a whole. Conceptually, this increase in the 
yield paid amounts to a premium for the additional risk 
incurred by the lender in  holding more of the asset. 
This risk can arise from the possibility of default, unex- 
pected  changes  in the asset price,  or other factors 
affecting an instrument's value to an investor. 
The risks associated with  U.S. external debt, how- 
ever, are significantly different from those typically 
associated with past debtor nations. The major  risks 
associated with lending to most foreign countries in the 
past have been sovereign  and  related  risks  arising 
from insolvency and/or the inability  of debtors to obtain 
the foreign exchange needed to repay creditors. Such 
risks are likely to be relatively small in the case of the 
United States, which can borrow in the major interna- 
tional currency, the dollar, and  allows capital to flow 
freely across  its borders.  In the aggregate at least, 
default risk on U.S. debt is also minor for the foresee- 
able future; even pessimistic projections of U.S. debt 
service burdens  are within  limits successfully  main- 
tained by other countries in the past. 
Instead, the primary risk to foreign holders of U.S. 
debt is likely to be exchange rate risk arising  from 
unexpected changes  in the dollar's value. With the 
United States a net debtor, a representative foreign 
investor will almost certainly have to maintain  a net 
exposure to dollar assets and thus will face the risk of 
loss from fluctuations in the dollar's value.'4 In large 
14Both U.S. and foreign residents face certain common  risks in 
holding dollar assets, in particular from unanticipated inflation, which 
reduces the purchasing power of dollar claims. Foreigners,  however, 
face greater losses from fluctuations in the dollar's real value 
(changes that do not  simply offset inflation  differentials) than U.S. 
holders. The reason is that the real depreciation reduces the  dollar's 
value more in terms of  foreign goods and services than it does in 
terms of U.S. goods. Dollar instruments are thus intrinsically more 
risky to foreign holders than to U.S. holders (the  reverse is of  course 
true of  foreign currency assets). 
Net Foreign Debt/GNP 
(Percent) 
Ratio 
4 part because of the potential  size of U.S. indebted- 
ness, this risk could become important and its effects 
on U.S. interest rates would be at the least persistent 
and very possibly quite significant in magnitude. Thus 
there is no reason to believe that the United States can 
avoid financing  strains from  external debt simply by 
borrowing in its own currency. Moreover, these strains 
are likely to increase as U.S.  indebtedness grows in 
relation to foreign wealth. 
Admittedly, very little information is available as to 
how large these effects might be. Even a modest 
increase  in U.S. real interest  rates,  however, could 
have significant long-term impacts on the U.S. econ- 
omy. Historically, U.S. real interest rates on highly rated 
corporate bonds have averaged between 2 and 4 per- 
cent, depending upon maturity. An increase of as much 
as one percentage point in this long-term average (an 
outcome that cannot be excluded on the basis of avail- 
able evidence) could add perceptibly  to the cost-of- 
capital  faced by domestic  enterprises and adversely 
affect domestic capital formation and the  productivity 
advances dependent on it.15 As noted  earlier, higher 
U.S. real interest rates also tend to raise the effective 
burden of servicing U.S. external debt. 
Beyond the effects on interest rates, the implications 
of U.S. indebtedness for this country's financial auton- 
omy and the stability of financial markets have raised 
concern. Worries have been expressed, for example, 
about the rise in  foreign ownership  and controlling 
interest  in  U.S. corporations that continual borrowing 
from abroad may produce. Foreign direct investment in 
the United States is very likely to rise significantly in 
coming years (for reasons only partly related to our 
external deficit), although foreigners' controlling share 
in U.S. industry is likely to remain well below that held 
in Canada and many other industrial countries.16 
There is also a real possibility that future growth in 
U.S.  net indebtedness will raise volatility in domestic 
financial markets and increase their  vulnerability to cer- 
tain disturbances. The basic reason is that the risks 
from  holding dollar assets are generally greater for for- 
eigners than for domestic residents. The larger the net 
exposure incurred by foreigners in financing U.S. defi- 
cits,  the  greater their potential  loss from  an  adverse 
change in the dollar's value. For this reason, a given 
15See Juann Hung,  Charles Pigott, and Anthony Rodrigues,  "Financial 
Implications of the U.S. External Deficit,' in this issue of the 
Quarterly Review. 
leln book value terms, the  gross stock of foreign direct  investment 
claims on the United States now amounts to about 6 percent of 
GNP. A doubling in this ratio  — probably no more than is likely over 
the next five years  — would place it well above the ratios for 
Germany and Japan, about equal to  the ratio for the United 
Kingdom, and well below the nearly 25 percent ratio for Canada. 
disturbance, say a perceived deterioration in U.S. eco- 
nomic prospects, could lead to greater shifts in desired 
foreign (and market)  holdings of dollars, and thus 
greater fluctuations in foreign exchange and domestic 
financial markets, as the share of U.S. assets held by 
foreigners increases. On this question also there is lit- 
tle evidence whether such effects are likely to be sig- 
nificant or not. However,  the sometimes  adverse market 
reaction to announcements of large  U.S. trade deficits 
over the last few years at least suggests that continued 
rapid growth in U.S. indebtedness could add to finan- 
cial volatility. 
Burdens on wealth and living standards 
Finally, it is often asserted that the United States will 
be poorer in the future as a result of the deficits and 
that the burden of servicing the external debt will lower 
future living standards. These living standard and 
wealth  implications clearly cannot be meaningfully 
defined  independently  of the ultimate  causes of the 
external deficit. In  particular, a deficit  that raises 
domestic investment and capital formation will gener- 
ally enhance national wealth and real incomes. As we 
have seen, however, the present U.S. deficit is a reflec- 
tion of reduced national saving from past trends rather 
than increased national investment; indeed, the ratio of 
net investment to GNP since 1982 has been the lowest 
of any postwar recovery. 
At the least,  future U.S. wealth will be impaired if  the 
relatively low national savings rate now underlying the 
external deficit continues. By the mid-1990s, in fact, the 
national wealth of this country could be nearly $1 tril- 
lion lower  — nearly $4000 per citizen  — than it would 
have been had the savings rate  remained at its 
pre-1980 average. 
Continuation of present trends is also likely to have 
an adverse cumulative  impact on the long-term real 
incomes and living standards of U.S. households. The 
servicing of the external debt itself  will probably not be 
the main source of this burden, however. The  debt ser- 
vice can largely be borrowed from abroad (without any 
further increase in the deficit or debt ratios to U.S. or 
foreign GNP). Only if the external debt raises interest 
rates drastically or if foreign lending is otherwise cur- 
tailed is a substantial trade surplus to meet the service 
payments likely to be required  — a very remote possi- 
bility although one that cannot be ruled out.  Real 
domestic spending will, of course, have to slow sharply 
from its past average to close the present gap with out- 
put as the trade  deficit declines; at that point, spending 
in relation to output will be back  on its pre-1980 trend. 
Nonetheless, even  if the debt  is largely serviced 
through continued foreign borrowing, the potential for 
future real output growth (and hence spending) is likely 
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consumption and government spending are  reduced 
significantly. As explained earlier, foreign financing of 
the excess of aggregate spending over output cannot 
continue indefinitely: its disappearance is a direct con- 
sequence of the necessary decline in the trade  deficit. 
If private consumption and government spending were 
maintained  at their present  levels relative to output 
under these circumstances, the present  rate of net 
investment eventually would be cut nearly in half, to 
about 3 percent of output.17 A net investment rate of 
3  percent would represent a very substantial departure 
from past trends; it would support  little more than a 
1 percent annual growth in the  nation's capital stock; 
and increases in capital per worker, a critical source of 
past productivity increases, would largely cease. 
Growth in future potential output and in productivity 
would very likely be reduced significantly, and growth 
in real wages and household incomes slowed consid- 
erably if not curtailed, by a decline in net investment of 
this magnitude. A large decline is inevitable, however, 
unless noninvestment spending is restrained and sav- 
ings raised relative to output. Admittedly, the impact of 
lower investment is small in any given year and may be 
imperceptible at first. Its effects, however, will accumu- 
late over time, with potentially significant adverse 
impacts on real earnings of workers and on living stan- 
dards some years from now. This prospect is especially 
of concern in view of the long-term need to raise pro- 
ductivity and  real  wages  to meet the needs of the 
growing retired proportion of the population. 
Adjustments to the deficit 
As we have seen, bringing the U.S. external position to 
a sustainable long-run equilibrium requires a substan- 
tial reduction in the trade deficit. Intrinsic to this resto- 
ration of equilibrium are two basic macroeconomic 
changes  that must  occur under  any circumstances. 
First, domestic spending  on  private  and public  con- 
sumption and investment must fall relative to domestic 
output; this means that the growth of domestic demand 
will have to be significantly below that of real GNP for 
at least several years. Second,  there must  be an 
expansion  of output and reallocation of resources 
toward manufacturing and other traded goods sectors 
relative to nontraded activities. These shifts will require 
significant changes in financial markets, in output and 
17As interest payments  rise, national income will fall relative to output. 
Standard consumption functions imply that consumption  will vary 
with income and hence decline as a share of output. To the extent 
this occurs, the "crowding out'  of  investment  will be reduced. 
However, this adjustment may well occur slowly, with the  higher per 
capita consumption  levels  maintained  for some time. 
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factor prices, and  in  spending  patterns. The exact 
nature and timing of these changes will depend upon 
the evolution of the factors underlying the deficit and 
other  future economic circumstances; in particular, the 
adjustments will be influenced by the interest rate and 
other  financial consequences of the accumulating U.S. 
indebtedness. Qualitatively, the changes necessary to 
restore equilibrium are the opposite of those associ- 
ated with the development of the deficit over the first 
half of this decade. This process of reversal has been 
underway for the last several years, but it clearly has 
further to go. 
Three elements of this adjustment process are par- 
ticularly  critical  and most likely to present  problems. 
The first is the reduction in the growth of domestic 
spending that is the necessary counterpart of the elim- 
ination  of the trade deficit.  Spending  now going to 
domestic needs—that is, some combination of govern- 
ment expenditure, private consumption and investment 
—will have to grow significantly more slowly over the 
next several years, particularly relative to the first half 
of the 1980s but also  in  comparison with historical 
averages. This reduction is, of course, necessary to 
correct the overspending relative to domestic produc- 
tion underlying the present trade deficit.  Even a rela- 
tively gradual adjustment in this imbalance is likely to 
entail a very marked shift in past spending growth; this 
is particularly true since resource constraints limit 
future output growth to rates significantly slower than 
those over the past several years. For example, elim- 
inating the present gap between spending and produc- 
tion (now about 3 percent of GNP) over the next five 
years would require that domestic demand growth fall 
to one-half or less of its nearly 4.5 percent annual 
increase over 1983-88. 
Second, the adjustment process is also likely to pose 
problems for the authorities  in  reconciling  domestic 
stabilization objectives  with the necessary require- 
ments of the external adjustment. The necessary slow- 
ing of domestic demand growth means, of course, that 
the U.S. economy will be more dependent upon stim- 
ulus from the external sector and, in this sense, more 
vulnerable to fluctuations in real growth abroad. At the 
same time, any significant further  dollar depreciation 
needed for the adjustment could add to domestic infla- 
tionary  pressures. In effect, therefore, the adjustment 
process is apt to mean a deterioration in the effective 
trade-offs between  the maintenance of full employ- 
ment, real growth, and price stability. (This again is a 
partial reversal of the situation facing U.S. authorities 
during the dollar's appreciation, which to some extent 
improved the trade-offs between growth and inflation.) 
The third key  aspect of the adjustment process 
involves the redistribution of national output and resources toward traded goods industries. This pro- 
cess will be beneficial in helping to restore the interna- 
tional competitiveness of U.S. industries,  which was 
seriously damaged by the dollar appreciation and other 
macroeconomic forces associated  with the develop- 
ment  of the trade deficit. The changes needed to 
achieve this reallocation, however,  may again lead to 
strains over the near to medium term. One concern is 
whether there will be sufficient capacity in U.S. manu- 
facturing industries to meet the growing demand from 
the external sector. Such constraints, to the extent they 
now exist, are likely to ease in coming years as manu- 
facturing industries invest  in  increased capacity to 
meet growing demand in international markets. But  this 
process could occur more  slowly than  in the past 
because firms may well  view such investments as more 
risky than before, given their losses from the trade  bal- 
ance deterioration, and hence may be more reluctant 
to expand capacity than in the past. 
A related concern is whether the changes in relative 
prices needed for the reallocation of activity  to traded 
goods sectors can occur without significant  upward 
pressures on the aggregate price level. Attracting the 
resources  needed to expand  capacity  will entail an 
increase in output prices and wages in manufacturing 
relative to nontraded goods sectors, at the same time 
that U.S. prices relative to those of foreign competitors 
must decline. Institutional impediments, such as rigidi- 
ties impeding downward adjustments of prices or 
strong tendencies  for domestic industries to match 
price changes by foreign competitors, may make it diffi- 
cult to accomplish the needed relative price adjust- 
ments in a noninflationary environment. 
All of these adjustments will be substantial, at least 
cumulatively,  although they are unlikely to be as severe 
as those implied by analyses assuming a balanced cur- 
rent account (or a zero net indebtedness position) as 
the necessary  endpoint. The severity of the adjust- 
ments will depend on  two factors that have  recently 
elicited much pessimism: the responsiveness of the 
trade balance to changes in the dollar, and the robust- 
ness of foreign real growth. 
The responsiveness  of the trade deficit to dollar 
changes depends essentially upon two conditions. The 
first is the response (that  is, elasticity) of the demands 
for U.S. traded goods to changes in their prices relative 
to those of competing foreign products; the lower this 
elasticity, the larger the deterioration in the terms of 
trade that will be needed to reduce the deficit.  The 
second factor  is the  pass-through of changes in the 
dollar to import prices relative to domestic  counter- 
parts:  the smaller this pass-through, the greater the 
depreciation required to achieve a given improvement 
in  U.S. relative to foreign traded goods  prices. The 
lower collectively these responses are, the greater the 
decline in the dollar and the terms of trade that will be 
needed to achieve a given improvement in the (nomi- 
nal)  trade balance.  In this sense,  the adjustments 
needed to restore external equilibrium are likely to be 
more severe, and the associated trade-offs between 
domestic  real growth  and  inflation less favorable, if 
these responses are low rather than high. Over the last 
several years, the responses of U.S. trade to changes 
in the dollar and relative prices seem to have been 
significantly smaller than those observed in earlier 
periods, although it remains unclear whether the more 
recent pattern reflects a lower overall response or sim- 
ply a longer delay in that response. If the former, the 
strains resulting from the adjustment may be signifi- 
cantly greater in proportional terms than during past 
episodes of trade deficit reduction. 
The robustness of foreign real growth  has similar 
implications for the severity of the adjustments. Achiev- 
ing equilibrium in the trade balance will require some 
combination  of slower real U.S.  domestic  demand 
growth  and dollar depreciation, the amounts being 
greater the slower  the real demand growth  abroad. 
Indeed, without adequate  growth  abroad it may be 
impossible to achieve a substantial  further improve- 
ment in  the U.S. trade deficit over the next several 
years while limiting dollar depreciation and maintaining 
full-employment growth in the United  States.  In this 
sense there is a potential trade-off between external 
adjustment and internal real growth and price stability 
objectives that partly depends upon foreign growth per- 
formance. It is largely for these reasons that U.S. poli- 
cymakers have repeatedly emphasized the importance 
of this performance to the global external adjustment 
process. 
Finally, delaying the changes needed to restore long- 
term equilibrium  and  relying  primarily on automatic 
market forces rather than changes in U.S. fiscal policy 
to achieve it are quite likely to increase the severity of 
the adjustments and the attendant  risks.  Postponed 
adjustment  will mean  larger  U.S. indebtedness and 
quite possibly higher U.S. real interest rates; if these 
conditions develop, the amount of trade deficit reduc- 
tion needed to restore  equilibrium will be greater. 
Largely for these reasons, delayed adjustment is likely 
to involve  more  severe  reductions in real spending 
growth, more dollar depreciation, and a riskier financial 
environment. A protracted adjustment will also mean 
postponement of the restoration of competitive equilib- 
rium to U.S. (and  foreign) manufacturing and  in this 
sense involves  microeconomic costs as well: as we 
have seen, the present allocation of resources between 
traded  and  nontraded goods  sectors underlying  the 
U.S. trade deficit effectively amounts to a departure 
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Fiscal policy will affect the severity of these adjust- 
ments in part because it will be a key determinant of 
the speed at which equilibrium is restored. Compared 
to a program of budget deficit  reduction, maintaining 
the current status of fiscal policy is very likely to mean 
a substantially slower reduction in the trade deficit, a 
larger accumulation of indebtedness, and hence more 
severe  financial and adjustment  consequences.  To 
illustrate with an extreme example, eliminating the U.S. 
trade deficit could take a decade or  more if the present 
ratio of  the U.S. budget deficit to GNP were to be main- 
tained. Unchanged fiscal policy is also likely to mean 
that most of the resulting (larger) adjustments will fall 
on private consumption and investment; capital spend- 
ing is thus likely to be most adversely affected in this 
case.18  In contrast,  lowering the deficit by reducing 
government spending is likely to place less burden on 
private spending. This does not necessarily mean that 
arbitrary fiscal policy measures should be undertaken 
simply to reduce the external deficit without regard to 
their other benefits and costs. These considerations do 
strongly suggest, as those worried by the external defi- 
cits  have warned, that there are real  and potentially 
quite costly trade-offs from simply waiting for the mar- 
ket to correct the deficit. 
Conclusion 
For most of this decade, warnings have been sounded 
about the adverse consequences of the U.S. external 
deficit, as well as the companion federal budget deficit. 
These warnings have focused on the potential reduc- 
tion in future living standards and wealth arising from 
the current  account  deficit and, increasingly, on the 
risks of a crisis if the imbalance is not brought down. 
Given that these dire consequences  for the most part 
have not occurred and that the U.S. economy remains 
apparently healthy in key respects, it is perhaps not 
surprising that skeptics have questioned whether the 
deficit is so great a problem. 
The analysis in this article suggests that while the 
skeptics have raised some valid points, the contention 
that policy makers  can ignore the current account 
imbalance without risk is incorrect. The U.S. external 
deficit is admittedly only the consequence of more fun- 
damental factors causing an imbalance between 
national savings and investment. Moreover,  restoration 
of equilibrium in the external accounts may not require 
that the current account deficit be eliminated entirely. 
leThis is  not to claim that lowering the budget deficit will lead to less 
severe adjustment regardless of  the policy used. Reducing the 
deficit by raising taxes on investment  could well have unfavorable 
consequences,  for example. 
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But these are  not the most important  issues to be 
addressed in evaluating policy toward the deficit. More 
basic from this perspective are the nature and severity 
of the adjustments needed to restore equilibrium and 
the long-term consequences of the U.S. indebtedness. 
This article has shown that there are genuine prob- 
lems associated with the external deficit, some already 
manifest. By any  standard, the  lost jobs and excess 
capacity in  the  U.S.  manufacturing sector during the 
first half of the 1980s have been important problems, 
with tangible  costs in terms  of resource reallocation 
and the resulting strains on the world trading environ- 
ment.  Other  potential  problems  associated  with the 
adjustment to the external deficit are also evident. The 
effects of the declining dollar, the response of trade 
flows, and  the need to slow  U.S. domestic  demand 
growth while  sustaining foreign  growth have become 
major focuses of concern about macroeconomic  policy 
here and  abroad. These concerns are apt to persist 
and perhaps intensify since, as we have seen, balance 
in the trade account must be restored and will take at 
least  the next several years, and conceivably longer, to 
be completed. 
Of as much, and perhaps even more,  concern are 
the longer term  financial  consequences of the U.S. 
indebtedness, in  part because  little is  known about 
their likely severity. A long-term rise of significant mag- 
nitude in U.S. real interest rates along with a substan- 
tial increase in financial market vulnerability to certain 
disturbances certainly cannot be ruled out if large defi- 
cits continue; such outcomes could have serious con- 
sequences for the growth and productivity performance 
of the U.S. economy in future  years. Admittedly, the 
possibility that the financing of the deficits will continue 
without significant strains or other adverse conse- 
quences cannot be ruled out either. This is not much 
comfort for policy makers, however, who cannot ignore 
prospective problems simply because their magnitude 
cannot be predicted with precision or  certainty. What is 
reasonably certain  is that the problems and risks that 
do arise from U.S.  indebtedness  will be persistent 
ones; once these problems appear, policy makers will 
face  a choice  between allowing them to continue or 
making substantial further protracted  adjustments  in 
the current account to bring the debt back down. 
The ongoing and adjustment costs, and their likely 
aggravation as the deficits persist, are one set of con- 
siderations that must be weighed in deciding on poli- 
cies toward the external imbalance. Policy must also 
be based, of course, on the other  costs and benefits of 
specific measures to reduce the deficit. Not all actions 
to reduce the deficit are equally desirable, and indeed 
some  — for example, measures that discourage invest- 
ment or raise trade barriers—are likely to create more problems than they solve. Nonetheless, the overall evi-  reduce this spending is advisable in light of the grow- 
dence strongly suggests that the U.S. external imbal-  ing problems that continuing external deficits are likely 
ance is primarily  the  result of increased private  to bring. 
consumption and public spending arising in part from 
government actions. The question for policy is, there- 
fore, whether postponing the changes needed to  Charles Pigott 
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